The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government.

Article 21 (3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly, December 10, 1948 

Nevertheless, a number of Indonesian leaders understand the high price Jakarta is paying for its occupation of East Timor. (As Indonesia's foreign minister put it in March 1992, "Timor is like a sharp piece of gravel in our shoes.") Although some military brass and big business owners have gotten rich off of East Timor, it's never become the prosperous province that Indonesia hoped it would, and probably 20,000 Indonesian soldiers—or even more—have lost their lives in the war. 

East Timor has been a disaster for Jakarta diplomatically as well. A number of Western European countries, as well as the European Parliament, have increased diplomatic activity on the issue of East Timor. UN-sponsored talks between Indonesia and Portugal resumed in 1992, and this time they're accompanied by consultations with East Timorese who are independent of Jakarta. 

Recently, Indonesia's foreign minister ended Jakarta's long-standing refusal to meet with pro-independence East Timorese and sat down with the CNRM's José Ramos-Horta. Still, Indonesia refuses to discuss self-determination for East Timor, and maintains a heavy military presence there. 

In September 1992, in response to a groundswell of grassroots pressure following the Santa Cruz massacre, the US Congress cut off IMET (International Military Education and Training) funds worth $2.3 million to Indonesia. This was the first time Washington had reduced aid to Indonesia since the invasion of East Timor—and it occurred in spite of strong opposition from the Bush administration and major US corporations. 

The end of the Cold War and the election of Bill Clinton—who called US policy toward East Timor "unconscionable" during his campaign—also seemed to be hopeful signs. Indeed, in August 1993, Clinton's State Department refused to approve the Jordanian government's proposed sale of four US-made F-5E fighter jets to Indonesia. And in early 1994, public pressure forced the State Department to ban the sale of small arms to Indonesia. 

At the March 1993 meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, the US reversed its previously intransigent stance and cosponsored a resolution condemning Indonesian human rights violations in East Timor. A number of Western countries followed suit—including Australia, which would have otherwise voted against the resolution—indicating the key role the US could play in determining East Timor's future. 

Nevertheless, the Clinton administration continues to provide significant economic assistance to Indonesia—$180 million worth over the last two years through the Consultative Group on Indonesia, a consortium of donor countries and organizations. The CGI was set up following the Santa Cruz massacre, when there was increased pressure to link aid to Indonesia to human rights. To prevent this from happening, Jakarta disbanded the Netherlands-chaired IGGI (see p. 49 above) in early 1992 and replaced it with the CGI, chaired by the World Bank. CGI members pledged about $5 billion to Indonesia in each of the last three years (1992, 1993 and 1994). 

The US also sold $30 million in weaponry to Indonesia in direct, government-to-government transactions in 1993 alone. Arms sales by US corporations—which require State Department approval—are estimated at $57 million for 1994. The Clinton administration is trying to reinstate Indonesia's IMET funding—and has sidestepped the ban in any case by letting Indonesia purchase the training. Joint US-Indonesia military exercises continue. 

Nonetheless, the small but significant changes that have occurred in US policy demonstrate the effectiveness that grassroots pressure can have. Since the Santa Cruz massacre, East Timor has become an issue of considerable debate, and both members of Congress and the public are increasingly challenging the US government's complicity in Indonesia's genocidal policies. 

In the US and Canada, East Timor solidarity groups (both called ETAN) have played a crucial role in publicizing their governments' complicity in the Indonesian occupation. These organizations now have active chapters in several cities. For information on how to contact them, see What you can do. 

There are also East Timor solidarity groups in Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Britain, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, South Korea, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Sweden and other countries. Even within Indonesia itself, significant parts of the pro-democracy and human rights movements are now in favor of East Timorese self-determination, a position unthinkable prior to the Santa Cruz massacre. 

As their resistance has demonstrated so dramatically through the years, the will of the East Timorese people for independence will be difficult to eradicate. Xanana Gusmao once said, "To resist is to win." Through its resistance to Indonesian tyranny, East Timor survives. 

Those of us outside of East Timor can help the the long-suffering East Timorese not only to survive but to live. Strong public pressure on the US and other Western countries can force Indonesia to withdraw, and can bring about an internationally supervised vote on self-determination. 

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[For a hard copy of this book, try your local bookstore or call Odonian Press at 800 REAL STORY.  Or visit Common Courage Press]